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Abstract
The discursive dilemma implies that the policy decision of a board
of policymakers depends on whether the board reaches the decision by
voting directly on policy (conclusion-based procedure), or by voting
on the premises for the decision (premise-based procedure). We derive
results showing when the discursive dilemma may occur, both in a
general model and in a standard monetary policy model. When the
board aggregates by majority voting, a discursive dilemma can occur if
either (i) the relationship between the premise and the decision is non-
monotonic, or (ii) if the board members have di⁄erent judgments on
at least two of the premises. Normatively, a premise-based procedure
tends to give better decisions when there is disagreement on parameters
of the model.
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11 Introduction
In most central banks, interest rate decisions are made by a group of people
and not by a single policymaker. It is an empirical fact that the mem-
bers of these groups often disagree on the appropriate monetary policy, also
after having discussed and shared their information and assessments. Dis-
agreement generally re￿ ects di⁄erent judgments on relevant inputs for the
decision, such as the size of the output gap, the e⁄ect on demand by a change
in the interest rate, the slope of the Phillips curve, etc. If members disagree,
the group must ￿nd a way to aggregate the di⁄erent judgments into one
decision. The usual way to do this is to vote over the relevant policy alter-
natives, that is, a conclusion-based procedure (CBP). An alternative way
would be to vote over the size or importance of the relevant inputs and let
the decision follow from the aggregate judgments on these inputs. Denote
this a premise-based procedure (PBP). However, as the following example
illustrates, CBP and PBP may give di⁄erent decisions.
Suppose a monetary policy board agrees to set the interest rate according
to the classical Taylor rule, i.e., rt = rr￿
t + ￿￿ + 1:5(￿t ￿ ￿￿) + 0:5yt, where
rt is the nominal interest rate, rr￿
t is the neutral real interest rate, ￿￿ is the
desired rate of in￿ ation (in￿ ation target), ￿t is the rate of in￿ ation, and yt is
the output gap. The neutral real interest rate rr￿
t and the output gap yt are
not observable in practice, and the board members must judge their value.
Suppose that ￿t can be perfectly observed, and consider for simplicity a
situation where in￿ ation is on target; ￿t = ￿￿ = 2. Suppose that the board
has 9 members with individual estimates as in Table 1. If the board votes on




Members 1 - 3 2:0 1:0 4:5
Members 4 - 6 2:5 0:0 5:0
Members 7 - 9 2:0 0:0 4:0
Majority 2:0 0:0 4:5
the interest rate, the result will be the median interest rate, i.e., rt = 4:5.1
However, the interest rate which is consistent with the median judgments
on the inputs is rt = 4:0. Thus, if the board instead of voting directly on the
interest rate, votes on the inputs and lets the decision follow by the agreed
upon rule, there will be a di⁄erent decision. The board therefore faces what
is called a ￿ discursive dilemma￿(Pettit, 2001).
In this paper, we analyze the relevance and normative implication of the
discursive dilemma for monetary policy decisions. First, we build a simple
1We assume here pairwise majority voting and single-peaked preferences.
2but general model where a policy board aggregates quantitative judgments
by majority voting. Based on this model we give a new characterization
of under what conditions a discursive dilemma may arise and under what
conditions it never arises. Second, we apply the characterization from the
￿rst step to a canonical macroeconomic model and give corollaries for when
a discursive dilemma may and may not arise for monetary policy decisions.
Finally, we investigate the normative question of which procedure - CBP
versus PBP - that gives better monetary policy decisions. Compared to the
existing litterature on the discursive dilemma (see overview in Section 2),
our paper is, to our knowledge, the ￿rst that investigates which procedure
is the better when groups aggregate quantitative judgments.
The discursive dilemma seems unrecognized among both monetary the-
orists and practitioners, and economists more generally. To our knowledge,
the only discussion of this issue in the monetary policy literature is the brief
discussion by Faust and Henderson (2004) on "multistage decisionmaking",
which is equivalent to our premise-based decision procedure. Faust and
Henderson (p.133) claim that "there is no theorem of public decisionmaking
stating that the multistage decisionmaking approach is good for society".
Our analysis con￿rms that it is not possible to derive a general theorem
that says that one of the two decision procedures is always better. But
because of this, and since the two procedures often give di⁄erent results, it
is important to investigate when and understand why one decision proce-
dure is better than the other. Using a standard monetary policy model, we
￿nd that a premise-based procedure tends to give lower expected loss than
a conclusion-based procedure when the members have di⁄erent judgment
(estimates) on parameters of the model. Only in some special cases, where
the board members are overcon￿dent about their parameter estimates, is
the conclusion-based procedure better. Thus, unless the members are very
overcon￿dent, the premise-based procedure does better.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we give a brief
overview of relevant literature. We derive the general characterization result
in Section 3. In Section 4 we give the subsequent corollaries for when a
discursive dilemma may and may not arise for monetary policy decisions.
We analyse which procedure gives better decisions in Section 5. We discuss
some central assumptions and institutional implications of our results in
Section 6, and conclude by Section 7.
2 Literature
The setting in this paper is somewhat parallel to a setting where a group of
people aggregates binary judgments on interconnected propositions. In such
situations an aggregation inconsistency akin to the aggregation inconsistency
in the example of Table 1 may arise. To illustrate, suppose a committee
3agrees that a conclusion C is true if and only if two premises P1 and P2 are
true, i.e. C $ (P1^P2). Then there is a discursive dilemma if the members
of a committee with three members have judgments as in Table 2: Voting
directly on the conclusion gives "No", while voting on the premises gives
"Yes" on the conclusion.
Table 2: Example of the discursive dilemma in the binary case
P1 P2 C
Member 1 Yes No No
Member 2 No Yes No
Member 3 Yes Yes Yes
Majority Yes Yes No
This example applies to many situations. Consider for example an ed-
itorial board of a journal deciding through majority voting whether a sub-
mitted paper should be published, based on two necessary and su¢ cient
conditions: P1 : "The results are novel", and P2 :"The results are impor-
tant". Another example is a monetary policy board deciding whether to use
quantitative easing in a situation where the overnight policy rate is close to
zero. Suppose that they agree that two premises must be satis￿ed: P1 :"The
current monetary policy stance is not su¢ cient to bring the economy out
of the recession", and P2 :"Quantitative easing will be e⁄ective in stimu-
lating aggregate spending". Both these examples can be captured by Table
2 and thus be subject to a discursive dilemma. Furthermore, it is easy
to construct other examples with di⁄erent connections between the propo-
sitions,2 and di⁄erent types of aggregators.3 Recent research show that
these examples illustrate a more general aggregation problem when aggre-
gating judgments on propositions: If the propositions under consideration
are interlinked, then there exist no non-dictatorial aggregator full￿lling some
mild requirements that always aggregates consistent individual judgments
on these propositions into consistent collective judgments on these propo-
sitions (i.e. a discursive dilemma cannot be "ruled out"). List and Puppe
(2009) and List (2010) provide overviews of these results and the literature
on judgment aggregation. Dietrich (2007) provides a generalized model of
binary judgment aggregation.
The question of which procedure - CBP versus PBP - is better when
aggregating judgments on propositions has been approached from two per-
2Suppose, for instance, that the members agree that conclusion C is true if and only if
at least one of the two premises P1 and P2 are true, i.e., C $ (P1 _P2). Change all "yes"
in table 2 with a "no" and all "no" with a "yes", and a discursive dilemma will occur.
3Consider Table 2 and suppose, for instance, that there is a fourth member with the
same judgements as Member 1 (or Member 2). Suppose the aggregator is the following:
The aggregate judgement is the majority judgement if there is no tie. If there is a tie the
aggregate judgment is "yes".
4spectives. Pettit (2001) and Chapman (2003) apply a procedural perspective
and argue that decisions should be made for the right reasons, which, in their
view, favors PBP. They argue that this is particularly important from the
perspective of deliberative democracy, since a premise-based procedure "col-
lectivises" the reasons underlying a given decision. The second perspective,
suggested by Bovens and Rabinowicz (2003), is epistemic: The best proce-
dure is the one that is most likely to give the correct decision, irrespective of
the underlying reasons. From this perspective, it does not matter whether a
decision is reached through wrong judgments on the premises, as long as the
decision itself is correct. List (2005) considers both approaches, and his sim-
ulation results, where the group aggregates by majority voting, show that
PBP tends to be better than CBP both from a procedural and epistemic
perspective. Even if simulation results tend to favour the premise-based
procedure, the research con￿rms Faust and Henderson￿ s (2004) claim that
"there is no theorem of public decisionmaking stating that the multistage
decisionmaking approach is good for society", as it is possible to specify
assumptions under which CBP performs better than PBP, at least from an
epistemic perspective. However, the results from the literature are less rel-
evant for the type of decisions Faust and Henderson had in mind, namely
monetary policy decisions. Monetary policy decisions sometimes involve bi-
nary judgments, but quantitative judgments ￿judgments on the value of
relevant variables ￿are much more prevalent. Compared to the judgment
aggregation literature the important novelty of our current paper is that
variables need not be binary, which makes the framework more relevant for
economic decisions in general and monetary policy in particular.
Considering the aggregation of di⁄erent interconnected variables is not
new. A variety of aggregation problems has been proposed and solved in
production theory, see Blackorby and Schworm (1984) for an overview. Ru-
binstein and Fishburn (1986) consider the problem of aggregating the entries
in n rows in an n ￿ m matrix into a summary row, where every entry is an
element in an algebraic ￿eld. They ￿nd that if the entries always form a
hyperplane, then every consistent aggregator is an aggregator whereby the
aggregate estimate of a variable is the (normalized) linear sum of the in-
dividual estimates. If the entries do not form a hyperplane, there is no
consistent non-dictatorial aggregator. The situation we study in this paper
is somewhat similar to the situation studied by Rubinstein and Fishburn.
However, an important di⁄erence is that we assign one variable the role as
a dependent variable (￿ decision-variable￿ ) and the other variables the role
as independent variables (￿ premise-variables￿ ). Furthermore, we have less
strict domain restrictions.
The analysis in this paper is also related to Claussen and Rłisland (2010),
who consider a general social choice-theoretic model and give a generalisa-
tion of the discursive dilemma to quantitative judgments in the case when
the individual preferences are strict. In the current paper we relax the as-
5sumption of strict preferences and give a generalization for weak preferences
under majority voting (and averaging). In addition, we apply the model to a
monetary policy setting and analyze which of the two alternative procedures
that gives better decisions.
3 The quantitative discursive dilemma under ma-
jority voting
The typical economic decision-making problem is to decide the level of a
decision-variable, which may be non-binary and depend on a set of variables
and parameters which may also be non-binary (often continuous), which we
call inputs for the decision. The relationship between the decision-variable
and the inputs is given by the reaction function
r = R(x1;x2;:::;xm); (1)
where r is the decision-variable and x1;x2;:::;xm are the input-variables.
The reaction function could be the result of optimization, or it could be a
simple policy rule.
When the decisions are taken by a group and some inputs are not fully
observable, the group members may not agree on the size of the inputs in
the reaction function. Moreover, even if the reaction function is based on
observable input variables, the group members may disagree on the speci￿-
cation of the reaction function. For example, if the general reaction function
is linear of the form r = BX, where X is the vector of input-variables and
B is the vector of coe¢ cients, the members might agree on the values of
X, but disagree on B. We will de￿ne a premise-variable as a variable or
parameter in the reaction function on which the members may disagree.
Thus, the elements in X and B can be premise-variables or not depending
on whether the members may disagree on their sizes. With this de￿nition
of premise-variables, we let the relation between the decision-variable r and
the premise-variables p1;p2;:::;pk be denoted the dependence function
r = D(p1;::::;pk): (2)
The dependence function is thus derived from the reaction function, where
the variables and parameters in the reaction function on which the group
members may disagree, enter as arguments (premise-variables) in the de-
pendence function. k is the number of premise-variables. Parameters or
variables which there are never disagreement about are captured by the
functional form D(￿). Since everything the members may disagree on is de-
￿ned as premise-variables, they agree by construction on the D(￿)-function.
The D(￿)-function is just an analytical device which is useful for ana-
lyzing the discursive dilemma, and the assumption that all members agree
6on the dependence function is not a strong assumption. The existence of
a dependence function only requires that there exists one property of the
reaction function on which the members can agree. To ￿x ideas, consider
the reaction function r = R(￿) = ￿￿, where ￿ is underlying in￿ ation and ￿
is the coe¢ cient on in￿ ation. If the members of the board agree on the reac-
tion function, but may have di⁄erent estimates of underlying in￿ ation, the
dependence function is equal to the reaction function, i.e., r = D(￿) = ￿￿.
If the members instead can observe ￿, but may disagree on the coe¢ cient
￿, then ￿ is the premise-variable and ￿ is the coe¢ cient in the dependence
function, i.e., r = D(￿) = ￿￿.4 If the members may disagree on both
the response coe¢ cient and the level of underlying in￿ ation, we have that
r = D(￿;￿) = ￿￿. Note that the dependence function now becomes multi-
plicative even if the underlying reaction function is linear. If one can specify
a general form of the reaction function R(￿) that encompasses all members￿
individual reaction functions, and if this function can be described by a ￿-
nite set of parameters, it is always possible to specify a dependence function.
Since the focus of the paper is on judgment aggregation, it is natural to focus
on the dependence function instead of the reaction function, as the former
specify the relationship between the decision and the potentially diverging
individual judgments. With this de￿nition of a dependence function, there
is a discursive dilemma if the majority judgments on the premise-variables
support another decision than the outcome of a majority vote on the deci-
sion, as illustrated by the example of Table 1 in the introduction.
We will now give a more general characterization of when there is a
discursive dilemma. Consider a board with n members, where n > 2 and
odd. The dependence function is given by (2) where each premise-variable
can take values in a set Pj 2 R. The set Pj has at least two elements and
might be ￿nite or in￿nite. Thus, premise-variables may be continuous or
discrete variables, and the domain of the dependence function is P1￿:::￿Pk.
Let pj;i denote member i￿ s estimate on (judgment of) premise-variable j, i.e.
pj;i 2 Pj. Since each member agrees (by construction) on the dependence
function, member i￿ s preferred r is given by
ri = D(p1;i;p2;i;:::;pk;i): (3)
An individual sequence (of estimates) qi is a vector with one estimate for
each premise variable and one estimate for the decision variable such that
(3) holds, i.e., qi = (p1;i;:::;pk;i;ri). A pro￿le (of individual sequences)
g = (q1;:::;qn) is an n ￿ (k + 1)-touple with one sequence for each member.
For each variable, the committee aggregates the individual judgments
4The coe¢ cient in the dependence function will then be time-varying, as ￿ is time-
varying. However, the dependence function is de￿ned over the individual judgments at
a given point in time (i.e., the monetary policy meeting) and has thus a "cross-section"
distribution.
7Table 3: Scheme of aggregation
p1 pj pk r












n p1;n; ￿￿￿ ; pj;n; ￿￿￿ ; pk;n D(￿) ! rn
A(￿) A(￿) A(￿) A(￿)
# # # #
pA
1 ; ￿￿￿ ; pA
j ; ￿￿￿ ; pA
k D(￿) ! rP;rC
into the committee￿ s aggregate judgment by some aggregator A(￿) (e.g., the
median or the mean of the individual estimates for each variable). Denote
the aggregate estimates by pA
j ; j = 1;:::;k and rA, i.e.
pA
j = A(pj;1;pj;2;:::;pj;n); j = 1;:::;k
rA = A(r1;r2;:::;rn):





while CBP is de￿ned as
rC = A(r1;::::;rn): (5)
The aggregation problem is illustrated in Table 3. We then have the follow-
ing de￿nition of the discursive dilemma for non-binary judgments:
De￿nition 1 There is a discursive dilemma for pro￿le
g = (p1;1;:::;pk;1;r1;:::;p1;n;:::;pk;n;rn) if rC 6= rP.
We see that the existence of a discursive dilemma depends on both the
dependence function D(￿) and the aggregator A(￿). We shall focus on ma-
jority voting, but discursive dilemmas may arise also with other aggregators.
For example, if the group uses averaging as the aggregation method, it fol-
lows directly from Jensen￿ s inequality that there is a discursive dilemma
if the dependence function is non-linear, since mean(D(p1;p2;:::;pn)) =
D(mean(p1;p2;:::;pn)) only if D is linear and under some special non-linear
functions. The reason why we focus on majority voting is that this is the
most commonly used aggregation method among monetary policy boards in
practice. Although majority voting is generally not the optimal aggregation
8method, it has the advantage that it is, under certain assumptions, robust to
strategic behavior (Black 1948).5 This property, together with its simplicity,
probably explains the popularity of majority voting. Linear aggregators like
averaging on the other hand, are very vulnarable to strategic behavior and
are rarely used in practice, at least by monetary policy boards. We shall
discuss strategic behavior further in Section 6.1.
We assume that each member￿ s ￿ preferences￿over each variable are single-
peaked around the member￿ s best estimate of the variable.6 Then the out-
come of a pairwise majority vote over the alternative values for a variable is
￿by the median voter theorem ￿the median of the individual estimates for
the variable. With the median as the aggregator we can have that rC 6= rP
even if D is linear, as illustrated by the example in the introduction. How-
ever, if D is linear, there must be more than one premise-variable in order
to have a discursive dilemma under majority voting. In the case of only
one premise-variable, i.e., k = 1, there will never be a dilemma if D is
monotonic, since there is a one-to-one mapping from the premise-variable to
the decision-decision variable. If D is strictly non-monotonic, a discursive
dilemma can exist even if k = 1, see example in Figure 1. The following
proposition summarizes this result:
Proposition 1 Suppose that, for each variable, the board aggregates over
the individual estimates by a pairvise majority vote over the alternative es-
timates for the variable. Suppose that each member of the board has single
peaked preferences over each of the variables. Then there exists a pro￿le of
individual estimates with a discursive dilemma if and only if
(i) there are two or more premise-variables, or
(ii) there is one premise-variable and the dependence function is strictly
non-monotonic.
Proof. See Appendix (which also have a strict formal model of the
aggregation problem).
The proposition is related to the characterization in Claussen and Rłis-
land (2010), but the above proposition is derived under more general as-
sumptions about the members￿preferences over the alternatives for each
5There is a caveat to this; if MPC members are allowed to express non-single-peaked
preferences, voting cycles may occure. Depending on how these cycles are resolved, there
can be incentives for single members or groups of members to behave strategically, see e.g.
Blin and Satterthwaite (1976) for a simple example.
6By ￿ preferences￿over variable j (or the policy variable) we mean a complete, transitive
and weak order on Pj (or a set Y ￿ R of alternatives for r). The term ￿ preference￿should
not be taken literally. All we assume is that each member can, for any two distinct
alternatives x;z 2 Pj (or Y ), say that she weakly ￿ prefers￿ x to z (or z to x). The
de￿nition does not say anything about why she ￿ prefers￿x to z. Member i could, for
instance, prefer x to z because she ￿nds that x gives her higher utility than z, she could
prefer x to z because she believes that x is closer to the true value of the variable than z
(it is a "better estimate"), or ￿if variable j is a policy variable ￿she could prefer x to z
because she ￿nds that x gives higher social welfare than z.
9variable, but less general assumptions about the aggregation method. Propo-
sition 1 applies to any sort of collective economic decisions, not only collec-
tive monetary policy decisions. It applies, for example, to corporate boards
deciding on investment projects based on judgments on costs and revenues,
or committees of experts giving advice on the appropriate level of taxes.
Regarding the normative question of which procedure that gives better
decisions, it is not possible to derive a general proposition. To investigate the
relevance of the dilemma in practice and the normative question of which
procedure that gives the better decisions, one has to apply a particular
model. In the next section we investigate these issues within a standard
New Keynesian monetary policy model.
4 The discursive dilemma in monetary policy
The model in Section 3 applies to any group making decisions based on
quantitative judgments. In the rest of the paper, we apply the general
model to monetary policy decisions, but the results have relevance also for
other types of decisions. Since the groups making monetary policy decisions
have di⁄erent names in di⁄erent countries, we will in the following use the
generic term ￿ monetary policy committee￿ (MPC) for such groups. The
policy instrument is the interest rate, which the MPC decides by majority
voting. We abstract from strategic voting. As in Section 3, we assume that
each MPC member￿ s preferences over each variable is single-peaked around
the member￿ s best estimate of the variable, such that the median voter
theorem applies. In Section 6, we discuss the assumption of majority voting
and non-strategic voting.
An MPC meeting can be thought of as a two-stage process. In the ￿rst
stage - the deliberation stage - the MPC members share their individual
judgments and discuss relevant issues. In the second stage - the decision
stage - the MPC decides on the interest rate. During the deliberation stage,
the MPC members may adjust their judgments such that they converge to a
common judgment, but they may not always reach full consensus. The focus
of the paper is not on optimal information pooling or on why members may
still disagree after the deliberation stage. We therefore assume that the MPC
has been through the deliberation stage, but has not reached full consensus.
And indeed, the minutes from the monetary policy meetings of the policy
boards of various central banks reveal a great deal of disagreement. At the
bank of England, for instance, there has been dissent at about 60 percent
of the meetings. At the Bank of Japan there has been dissent at 50 percent
of the meetings, and at the Swedish Riksbank at about 34 percent of the
meetings. On the face of it, the degree of dissent appears smaller at the
FOMC. Meade (2005) reports a dissent rate of 7.5. However, she ￿nds that
the FOMC￿ s rates of disagreement are quite similar to dissent rates at the
10Bank of England if one looks at opinions expressed during the discussion of
policy proposals.
Most existing theories on the information pooling role of MPCs do not
deduct why members still disagree after the deliberation stage. However,
Gerlach-Kristen (2008) models the deliberation stage and assumes that each
member observes the other members￿signals with an error, which explains
why disagreement will persist also after optimal Bayesian updating. Other
reasons for disagreement can be found in experimental evidence from cogni-
tive psychology showing that people generally do not aggregate information
in an unbiased manner. One reason for such a bias is overcon￿dence. Over-
con￿dence has been found in many professions,7 and it would be surprising
if it was not also present among monetary policymakers. We will come back
to the implications of overcon￿dence for the choice of decision procedure
below.
4.1 The model
We consider the canonical New Keynesian model
￿t = ￿Et￿t+1 + ￿yt + ut; (6)
yt = Etyt+1 ￿ ￿(rt ￿ Et￿t+1) + vt; (7)
where ￿t is in￿ ation, yt is the output gap, rt is the interest rate, ut is
a "cost-push" shock, for example, stemming from stochastic variations in
￿rms￿market power, and vt is a "demand shock", which could be interpreted
as stochastic variations in the natural rate of interest, where the long-run
equilibrium real rate is for simplicity set to zero. The MPC￿ s objectives are




which might be interpreted as the mandate given to the central bank by the
political authorities. The problem of the MPC is to set the interest rate so





As a benchmark, consider ￿rst the case where the MPC members have
identical judgments. This case is tantamount to the case with a single poli-
cymaker. We assume that the MPC follows a discretionary policy. Assuming
commitment in stead of discretion would add history-dependence to the re-
action function, but the nature of the discursive dilemma would not change.
We therefore focus on discretion to keep the analysis as simple as possible.
7See Yates (1990) for a survey.
11The ￿rst-order condition of optimal policy under discretion is8
￿￿t + ￿yt = 0: (9)
The ￿rst-order condition (9) can be interpreted as a ￿ target criterion￿(Svens-
son (2003) and Woodford (2007). In section 5.2 we will discuss how commit-
ment to a target criterion could support premise-based decisions. We will,
however, assume here that the MPC does not commit to a target criterion,
but votes on the instrument. We then need to derive from (9) the reaction
function. Inserting the Phillips curve and the IS-curve into (9) and solving
for the interest rate gives the reaction function





￿(￿2 + ￿) + ￿￿
(￿2 + ￿)






With rational expectations, we know that the system (6), (7) and (10) satis-
￿es the Blanchard-Kahn conditions for equilibrium determinacy, and a suf-
￿cient condition is that the coe¢ cient on Et￿t+1 is greater than one. Note
that this coe¢ cient is always greater than one, irrespective of the judgments
on the parameters. Thus, even if the individual MPC members might have
di⁄erent preferred coe¢ cients on expected in￿ ation in their individual re-
action functions, the Taylor principle will still always be satis￿ed, and a
unique equilibrium will be established. To keep the reaction function as
simple as possible, we assume that there is no persistence in the shocks, i.e.,
Etvt+1 = Etut+1 = 0, which implies that the unique equilibrium is charac-
terized by Et￿t+1 = Etyt+1 = 0. We will therefore for simplicity disregard











as our "reaction function", although (11) is actually a reduced-form solution
and not a reaction function as (10).9 We will modify the reaction function
slightly below in order to depart from certainty equivalence.
8Under commitment to the timeless perspective, the level of the output gap is replaced
by the change in the output gap, see Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999).
9An important di⁄erence between the reaction function (10) and the reduced-form
solution (11) is that inserting (10) into the model (6) and (7) gives determinacy, while
inserting (11) into the model gives indeterminacy, since the interest rate in (11) only
responds to exogenous variables.
124.2 The discursive dilemma
Based on equation (11), we see that disagreement about the interest rate
can be due to disagreement about (i) preferences (￿),10 (ii) state-variables
(vt and ut), or (iii) parameters (￿ and ￿). We shall discuss each in turn.
Note that non-state-variables (jump-variables) like ￿t and yt are functions of
both state-variables and parameters of the model. We may then decompose
disagreement on jump-variables into disagreement on state-variables and/or
parameters.
4.2.1 Preferences
Consider ￿rst the case where the MPC members may di⁄er in their pref-
erences, i.e., they have di⁄erent ￿s in their loss functions (8). Evidence
of such preference heteregeneity in MPCs are found in Riboni and Ruge-
Murcia (2008). Recent research derives model-based loss functions based
on the utility of the representative household. ￿ depends then on the deep
parameters of the model. From this perspective, disagreement about deep
parameters gives rise to disagreement about ￿. Even if this approach en-
sures consistency between the model and the loss function, the relationship
between ￿ and the deep parameters in the model is likely to be less clear
when considering MPC members￿preferences and assessments in practice.
Therefore, we adopt the traditional approach to the loss function, where ￿
represents the policymaker￿ s preferences, and disregard a potential relation-
ship between the MPC members￿preferred ￿s and their estimates of the
deep parameters of the model.
From the reaction function (11) we see that the dependence function
rt = D(￿) is monotonic in ￿. Thus, together with Proposition 1 we have
the following result:
Corollary 1 There will never be a discursive dilemma if the MPC members
disagree on ￿ only.
Since there is no di⁄erence between rC and rP when the MPC mem-
bers disagree on ￿ only, the two procedures - PBP and CBP - are of course
normatively equivalent in this case. However, we should add that this only
holds when there are two variables in the loss function, and thus one relative
weight. If there are more than two variables, and thus more than one rel-
ative weight, for example an additional term with interest rate smoothing,
discursive dilemmas could occur.
10Note that ￿ preferences￿here is used in a di⁄erent meaning than in section 3, where the
term is de￿ned in footnote 6. ￿ refers to preferences on the appropriate trade-o⁄ between
in￿ ation and output stabilization.
134.2.2 State-variables
Suppose that the MPC members may disagree about the state-variables in
the reaction function, i.e., on vt and/or ut. Although it is common in the
literature to assume that the state-variables are perfectly observable, this is
not the case in practice.11 With potential disagreement about the shocks,
the dependence function rt = D(vt;ut) is linear. With disagreement about
the size of only one of the state-variables, we have from Proposition 1:
Corollary 2 There will never be a discursive dilemma if the MPC members
disagree about only vt or ut.
If the MPC members disagree on both vt and ut, we have:
Corollary 3 A discursive dilemma can occur if the MPC members disagree
about both vt and ut:
4.2.3 Parameters
Suppose that the MPC members may disagree about the parameters in the
model, that is, on ￿, and ￿ in (11), but agree on the state-variables. The
various parameters enter the reaction function (11) di⁄erently, which gives
rise to a di⁄erent functional form of the dependence function depending on
which parameter the MPC members disagree on. We consider each parame-
ter separately.
Consider ￿rst disagreement on the interest rate elasticity, that is, the
size of ￿. We see from (11) that the dependence function r = D(￿) becomes
non-linear, but monotonic. Thus, together with Proposition 1 we have the
following:
Corollary 4 There will never be a discursive dilemma if the MPC members
disagree about ￿ only.
Consider then the case where the MPC members disagree only about the
slope of the Phillips curve, i.e., ￿. Evidence of di⁄erent individual judgments
on ￿ is found in Tillmann (2009), based on the data set on the FOMC mem-
bers￿individual forecasts provided by Romer (2009). With disagreement
on ￿; the dependence function r = D(￿) becomes strictly non-monotonic
(unless ￿ = 0). Thus, Proposition 1 implies the following result:
Corollary 5 A discursive dilemma may occur if the MPC members disagree
about ￿ only, except in the special case with ￿ = 0.
11Walsh (2007) assumes that the shocks are observed with noise, and he discusses the









Figure 1: The discursive dilemma under disagreement on ￿ (and ut > 0).
The corollary is illustrated in Figure 1, where there are three members of
the MPC with estimates ￿1;;￿2;￿3. The median judgment on the slope co-
e¢ cient is ￿2, which implies the interest rate r2, while the median judgment
on the interest rate is r1.
Notice also that since D(￿) has only one local maximum (which is also
global), we have that rP ￿ rC, i.e, the interest rate responds more aggres-
sively to cost-push shocks under PBP than under CBP.12 Thus, we have the
following proposition:
Proposition 2 When there is disagreement on ￿, and the discursive dilemma
applies, CBP implies a more attenuated response to shocks than PBP.
Proof. See appendix.
Above we have implicitly assumed that the MPC members do not take
uncertainty into account when making judgment about the appropriate in-
terest rate. This is a reasonable assumption when there is additive uncer-
tainty, since certainty equivalence holds in linear-quadratic models with ad-
ditive uncertainty. However, when considering parameter uncertainty, which
enters multiplicatively, certainty equivalence no longer holds. We now apply
the more reasonable assumption that the individual MPC members consider
12With negative shocks, the case is symmetric, i.e., one minimum and r
P ￿ r
C.
15their judgments uncertain and take that into account when judging the ap-
propriate interest rate. The MPC members are thus assumed to minimize
the loss function (8) conditional on their information and the uncertainty
they attach to their estimates. Following the seminal work of Brainard
(1967), taking parameter uncertainty into account gives the following gen-
eralization of the reaction function (10):
rt = R(Et￿t+1;Etyt+1;vt;ut) =
(￿2 + ￿2
a)(￿2 + ￿2
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The parameters ￿ and ￿ should now be interpreted as the estimates of
the true, but unobservable, parameters, and ￿2
￿ and ￿2
￿ are the variances
of the judgment error in the estimates of ￿ and ￿ respectively. Again,
the reaction function implements a unique rational-expectations equilibrium
characterized by Et￿t+1 = Etyt+1 = 0, and we can therefore focus on the













As shown by Brainard, this type of parameter uncertainty gives rise to a
more cautious policy response to the shocks, although this is not a general
result.13
The individuals may or may not have the correct perception of the de-
gree of uncertainty. Let ~ ￿2
j denote the perceived variance of the judgment
error of premise-variable j. Consider ￿rst the case where the MPC members
have di⁄erent judgments on ￿, but take parameter uncertainty into account
when forming their desired interest rates. We see that the dependence func-
tion rt = D(￿) implied by (13) is non-monotonic in the case where ~ ￿2
￿ > 0,
contrary to the case with no perceived parameter uncertainty. With per-
ceived uncertainty about ￿, the dependence function D(￿) is still strictly
non-monotonic. Thus, we may summarize the results under disagreement
about ￿ and ￿ when MPC members take uncertainty into account as follows:
Corollary 6 If the MPC members take uncertainty into account, a discur-
sive dilemma may occur if the MPC members disagree about ￿ and/or ￿.
Since the discursive dilemma applies under disagreement about both
￿ and ￿ when the MPC members take uncertainty into account, and the
functional form of D(￿) and D(￿) is as in Figure 1, we have the following
proposition (sse proof of Proposition 2 in Appendix):
13For example, Soderstrom (2002) showed that uncertainty about the coe¢ cient on
lagged in￿ ation in the Phillips curve gives rise to a more aggressive policy.
16Proposition 3 When the MPC members have di⁄erent estimates of ￿ or ￿
and consider their estimates uncertain, the discursive dilemma implies that
CBP gives a more attenuated response to shocks than PBP.
The more attenuated response under CBP comes in addition to the
Brainard type policy attenuation that follows from parameter uncertainty.
The di⁄erence between the two procedures in terms of the interest rate re-
sponse to shocks has potential welfare implications, which we shall analyze
in the next section.
5 Normative analysis
As discussed in Section 2, the social choice literature approaches the nor-
mative question of which procedure is better from two perspectives. From
a procedural perspective, the decision should be made for the right reasons.
From an epistemic perspective, the best procedure is the one that is most
likely to give the correct decision, irrespective of the reasons. Within a bi-
nary choice model, it is meaningful to consider the probability of a "correct"
decision as the normative criterion. For example, a defendant is either guilty
or not guilty, and the jury￿ s task is to make the correct decision regarding
the defendant￿ s guilt. With no-binary judgments like monetary policy deci-
sions, the relevant normative criterion from an epistemic perspective could
be the expected loss. We will apply such an epistemic perspective and use
expected loss as the normative criterion when evaluating CBP and PBP,
without paying attention to which of the procedures that gives the best
aggregate judgments on the premise-variables.
To compute the loss, we utilize the determinacy property of optimal
policy, which in this model implies that Et￿t+1 = Etyt+1 = 0. We can then
write the solutions for yt and ￿t as
yt = ￿￿rt + vt (14)
￿t = ￿yt + ut = ￿￿￿rt + ￿vt + ut; (15)
where rt is given by (13). Since we assume that the policymakers follow
a time-consistent policy (discretion) and there is no extrinsic or intrinsic
persistence in the model, it su¢ ces to consider the current-period loss and




t + vt) + ut)2 + ￿(￿￿r
P=C
t + vt)2; (16)
where r
P=C
t denotes the reduced-form solution of the interest rate under PBP
and CBP, as de￿ned in equations (4) and (5), respectively. Since the distri-
bution of the median in small samples does not have a tractable analytical
solution, we evaluate the expected loss using Monte Carlo simulations. In
17the simulations we use the following assumptions.
1. The individual MPC members￿judgments (estimates) of premise-variable
pj are given by
pj;i = pj + zj;i: j = 1;:::k; i = 1;:::n; (17)
where pj is the true, but unobservable, value of premise-variable j, and
zj;i is an i.i.d. judgment error. For state-variables, we assume that
the judgment errors are normally distributed, while for parameters
we assume that they have a gamma distribution in order to restrict
the judgments on ￿ and ￿ to be non-negative. The members are
equally competent, measured by ￿2
j, and our assumptions imply that
the individual judgment errors zj;i are uncorrelated. One may interpret
this assumption either as the case with no deliberations, or as a case
in which the members do not take the other members￿judgments into
account when forming their posterior judgments after the deliberation
round.14
2. The judgments of the n members are drawn 100 000 times. Since
their judgments are unbiased, we focus on a given realization of the
premise-variables. The true parameter values of the model is set to
￿ = 1, ￿ = 0:125 and ￿ = 0:021, where the values are taken from Gal￿
(2008, chapter. 3).
3. For each draw, the loss under CBP and PBP are computed, and the
average loss of the 100 000 draws are computed and used to compare
the two procedures.
Since the normative question is only relevant when CBP and PBP give
di⁄erent decisions, we will only consider the situations where the discursive
dilemma may occur. We will therefore consider the cases of (i) disagreement
on ut and vt, (ii) disagreement on ￿, and (iii) disagreement on ￿.
5.1 Disagreement on ut and vt
Consider ￿rst disagreement on ut and vt. By comparing the average loss
for all the draws, we ￿nd - not surprisingly - that they are on average
equal for CBP and PBP. In other words, even if the two procedures tend
to give di⁄erent interest rate decisions for actual realizations of judgments,
CBP and PBP yield the same expected loss.15 Although this result is not
14This is arguably an extreme assumption, but allowing for information sharing, which
would result in correlated judgment errors, will not a⁄ect the qualitative results. The
crucial assumption is that there will be some disagreement even after the deliberation
round.
15Our simulations show that there will be a discursive dilemma in more than two thirds
of the meetings.
18surprising, as it is somewhat related to the certainty equivalence property
of additive uncertainty in linear-quadratic models, the result still consitutes
an important benchmark.
5.2 Disagreement on ￿
Consider then disagreement about ￿. Since certainty equivalence does not
hold in this case, we assume that the MPC members take uncertainty into
account. However, as argued above, it is not obvious what to assume about
the MPC members￿perception of the degree of uncertainty. As we will show
below, the normative results depend on the MPC members￿perception of the
uncertainty in their estimates. We have from (13) that ut and vt enter the
reaction function equivalently, and with no loss of generality of the results,
we set vt = 0 and ut = 1. Figure 2 displays the expected loss under CBP and
PBP as a function of how the members perceive the degree of uncertainty.
We see that CBP is better when the perceived uncertainty is low, while PBP
is better when the perceived uncertainty is relatively high. CBP gives better
decisions when the MPC members are overcon￿dent, since CBP gives a
more attenuated policy response than PBP, which counteracts the excessive
aggressiveness due to overcon￿dence. However, for an "optimal" degree of
perceived uncertainty, de￿ned as the perception that gives the minimum
loss, PBP outperforms CBP. Only under extreme overcon￿dence, that is,
for ~ ￿￿ = 0, the two procedures give the same expected loss. The reason
is that there is no discursive dilemma in this case, since the dependence
function becomes monotonic when ~ ￿￿ = 0. Note that the results on ￿ carry
over to disagreement about ￿ in the special case where ￿ = 0.
5.3 Disagreement on ￿
Consider then disagreement about ￿ in the general case where ￿ > 0. Unless
￿ is very small, in which the same qualitative picture as in Figure 2 prevails,
the performance of the two procedures becomes as illustrated in Figure 3.
We see that PBP performs better than CBP for any degree of perceived
uncertainty. The reason is that a positive ￿ cuts o⁄ the left part of Figure
2, such that only the right part of the curve applies. This can be seen
from equation (13), where ~ ￿2
k and ￿ enter the dependence function similarly.
Having a positive ￿ is thus mathematically equivalent to having a higher
~ ￿2
￿. Thus, increasing ￿ from 0 gradually cuts the left part of the Figure 2,
and the range of ~ ￿2
￿ in which CBP performs better than PBP diminishes.
Table 4 summarizes our ￿nding for the three cases. Our interpretation
of the overall result favoring premise-based decisions, is that it is better to
aggregate judgments directly on the uncertain variable (or parameter) than
to transform the judgments into a decision-variable - the interest rate - and
do the aggregation on the transformed variable. The dependence function
























Figure 2: Expected loss under PBP and CBP as a function of perceived
uncertainty of the judgment on ￿.


























Figure 3: Expected loss under PBP and CBP as a function of perceived
uncertainty in the judgment on ￿.
20D(p) that transforms the judgments on the premise-variables to the judg-
ment on the interest rate, is derived from an optimal reaction function, but it
is nothing that ensures that aggregating judgments on the transformed vari-
able D(p) gives a better pooling of information than aggregating judgments
on p and then use D(p).
Table 4: Which decision-making procedure is better?
Premise-variables PBP vs CBP
Case 1 vt;ut ELP = ELC
Case 2 ￿
ELP > ELC if members are overcon￿dent (low ~ ￿￿)
ELP < ELC if members are "undercon￿dent" (high ~ ￿￿)
Case 3 ￿ ELP < ELC
6 Discussion
6.1 Assumptions
We have assumed that the MPC aggregates judgments by majority voting.
We use this aggregator for three reasons. First, majority voting is widely
used among MPCs in practice.16 Second, in theoretical models of collective
decision-making, majority voting (and single peaked preferences) is typically
assumed to be the aggregation method. Third, we want to relate our work
to the existing literature on binary judgment aggregation and introduce a
generalization of Pettit￿ s (2001) binary discursive dilemma to non-binary
quantitative judgments.
Majority voting is, however, not generally the optimal aggregation method.
For example, in our model, where the MPC members are equally competent,
averaging is a better aggregation method than majority voting, measured by
the expected squared collective judgment error. However, averaging is not
used by MPCs in practice. One reason could be that averaging is vulnerable
to strategic behavior.17 We discuss majority voting and strategic behaviour
below.
Even if majority voting often is the formal aggregation procedure in
MPCs, for some central banks an agenda-setting model may give a more
realistic description of the actual decision procedure. In such models, there
is a cost of voting against the chairman, and in equilibrium the chairman will
16However, some MPCs, like the Governing Council of the ECB, claim that their de-
cisions are consensus decisions. Nevertheless, it is hard to believe that policymakers in
consensus-seeking central banks always agree, and probably also these committees will
have to perform a vote, explicit or implicit, in the cases when members cannot agree.
17Under averaging, one member has unlimited power to in￿ uence the aggregate decision
by reporting a false judgment. Thus, if more than one member acts strategically, there
will not exist any Nash equilibrium under averaging.
21adjust his interest rate proposal such that he will never be outvoted, see. e.g.,
Riboni and Ruge-Murcia (2010). The agenda-setting models may, however,
be considered as majority voting models with some additional restrictions on
the voting structure or the utility functions, and the nature of the discursive
dilemma will remain.
We have also (implicitly) assumed that the MPC uses the same aggre-
gation method (majority voting) on all variables. However, if we allow for
di⁄erent aggregation methods on di⁄erent variables, we open for discursive
dilemmas also when the dependence function is strictly monotonic and there
is only one premise-variable. Thus, our assumption of the same aggregation
method on all variables bias the results towards less discursive dilemma
situations, not more.
We have assumed that the MPC members report their true judgments.
Although this assumption is a useful benchmark and a natural starting point
for analyzing the di⁄erence between CBP and PBP, the assumption is not
innocent. As mentioned in Section 3.1, majority voting is under certain
assumptions robust to strategic behavior, since when preferences are single-
peaked, the outcome (median) is a Nash equilibrium. However, this result
only applies to the one-dimensional case. We have assumed that the MPC
members have ￿ preferences￿on alternative values of the premise-variables,
where ￿ preferences￿here means ratings on how close to the truth a member
judges the alternative values for a given premise-variable are. Therefore,
while CBP makes the decision one-dimensional, since the MPC only de-
cides on the interest rate, PBP breaks the one-dimensionality and opens
up for strategic voting. The (lack of) strategy-proofness of PBP is consid-
ered by Dietrich and List (2007) in the binary judgment aggregation model.
They ￿nd that PBP is only strategy-proof (i.e., not manipulable by strate-
gic voting) for "reason-oriented" individuals, whereas PBP is not strategy-
proof for "outcome-oriented" individuals, in which case the outcome un-
der PBP becomes identical to the outcome under CBP. The distinction
between "reason-oriented" and "outcome-oriented" individuals is closely re-
lated to the distinction between a procedural and an epistemic perspective
on decision-making mentioned in Section 2. The lack of stragey-proofness of
PBP also applies to our model with quantitative judgments. If each MPC
member is "outcome-oriented" and aims to achieve an interest rate decision
that is as close as possible to his preferred interest rate, they have an incen-
tive under PBP to report a false judgment on the premise-variable(s). To
see how, consider member 1￿ s judgment on ￿ in Figure 1. Under PBP, the
interest rate under truthfulness would be r2. If member 1 instead reported
a judgment on ￿ which lies between ￿2 and ￿3, member 1 would become
the median voter and dictate r. The other members will then not have any
incentives to deviate, we have a Nash equilibrium, and PBP would yield the
same result as CBP.
Although PBP may not be strategy-proof for "outcome-oriented" MPC
22members, we will in the next section discuss how various institutional set-
tings may support premise-based decisions and thereby make strategic vot-
ing more conspicuous.
6.2 Implications for institutional design and communication
The above results suggest that the choice of decision-procedure matters, in
particular when the MPC members disagree on parameters. Except in the
case of overcon￿dence regarding the quality of individual judgments, PBP
gives on average better decisions than CBP. This result has institutional
implications, since it gives a case for designing institutions that support
premise-based decisionmaking. In practice, MPCs seem to spend a consid-
erable amount of time discussing important premises for the interest rate
decision. Whether the interest rate decisions are characterized by PBP or
CBP depends on (i) whether the judgments on these premises are aggre-
gated to a common judgment (e.g., through voting) and (ii) whether the
individual MPC members vote conditional on the aggregate judgments on
the premises or conditional on their own individual judgments. The an-
swer probably depends on the type of committee, in particular whether the
committee is ￿ individualistic￿or ￿ collegial￿ .18
The main inputs to policy decisions are the forecasts of in￿ ation and
economic activity. In some central banks, the MPC members take the sta⁄
forecasts as inputs, but do not take ownership of them. The Federeal Re-
serve System is an example of this. The members of the Federal Reserve
Open Market Committee (FOMC) receive forecasts from the sta⁄, but form
their own individual forecasts based on their individual views on appropri-
ate monetary policy. Even if the premises are discussed, it is likely that
the FOMC members base their votes on their individual forecasts. Thus,
the institutional setup and practice at the Federal Reserve System support
conclusion-based decisionmaking.
In other central banks, like the Bank of England, the forecasts are owned
by the MPC. The Bank of England￿ s forecasts are said to represent the
MPC￿ s "best collective judgment", even if it is not clear exactly how the
MPC decides on the forecasts. When the MPC owns the forecasts published
in in￿ ation reports or similar reports, the MPC members are more likely to
let their votes be based on the forecast. Another device that can support
premise-based decisionmaking is to have a "core" forecasting model, which
represents the MPC￿ s views on the economy. Then, di⁄erent judgments
on the importance of various economic mechanisms can be aggregated and
re￿ ected in the model.
One may conjecture that central banks with MPC-owned forecasts and
MPC-owned core models to a larger degree conduct premise-based deci-
18See Blinder (2007) for a description of di⁄erent types of committees.
23sions. However, this may not generally be the case, as other institutional
settings can counteract PBP. For example, even if the MPC of the Bank of
England owns the In￿ ation Report and the core model, the MPC members
are individually accountable for their interest rate votes. This implies that
each member￿ s interest rate vote should be based on his/her own judgments
on the premise-variables and not on the MPC￿ s "best collective judgment"
in cases where these judgments di⁄er. Thus, individual accountability for
the interest rate vote supports CBP, as opposed to PBP. However, it is in
principle possible to relocate the individual accountability, such that the
MPC members are held individually accountable for their judgments on
the premise-variables instead of the interest rate. This would arguably be
more consistent with MPC ownership of the in￿ ation report and the core
forecasting model.
Central banks would generally strive to achieve consistency between the
decisions and the forecasts. However, the combination of individual account-
ability on interest rate votes, which implies CBP, and MPC-owned forecasts,
as in the Bank of England case, gives rise to a challenge in terms of consis-
tent communication. This challenge was identi￿ed and discussed by Donald
Kohn, who was asked by the Bank of England to assess the transparency of
the policymaking process at the MPC19:
"To achieve at least rough alignment between policy and the forecast,
whatever is published should re￿ect the ￿center of gravity￿of the Committee
that made itself felt in the most recent policy decision. However, determining
and presenting a view that would explain actions and shape expectations
constructively is di¢ cult in the context of a Committee, especially one with
emphasis on individual accountability."
If decisions are made by CBP, as in the Bank of England, the discursive
dilemma implies that there may be inconsistency between the decision and
the forecasts if the forecasts re￿ ect the "center of gravity" of the MPC. The
only way to ensure consistency under CBP is to publish the forecasts that are
consistent with the forecasts belonging to the median voter on the interest
rate. However, as our analysis of the discursive dilemma shows, the forecasts
(that is, the judgments on the premises-variables) of the median voter on
the interest rate may be quite di⁄erent from the median judgments on the
premises. Thus, if interest rate decisions are made by CBP, the MPC could
either choose to present the median judgments on the premises, which might
result in inconsistency between the decision and the forecasts, or to present
the forecasts belonging to the median voter on the interest rate, which might
not re￿ ect the "center of gravity" of the MPC. A third option under CBP is
to do like the FOMC, namely to present the forecasts of all MPC members
instead of a single aggregate forecast. Potential inconsistencies between the
decision and the forecasts are, however, always avoided if the MPC uses
19The ￿ Kohn report￿ , Kohn (2001).
24PBP. Then, the decision follows directly from the aggregate judgments on
the premises (forecasts).
One institutional obstacle to PBP is that it is di¢ cult for an MPC
to decide on a principle for the interest rate setting that gives rise to a
dependence function on which each MPC member agrees. Full PBP implies
that the interest rate decision follows from the dependence function, so that
the MPC only needs to focus on the premise-variables. If the MPC decides
to let the interest rate be dictated by an interest rate rule, where they vote
on the coe¢ cients in the rule, one could achieve PBP. However, for reasons
put forward by Svensson (2003) and others, central banks are reluctant to
commit to a speci￿c interest rate rule. Woodford (2010) has suggested that
central banks should instead specify a "target criterion" which determines
monetary policy. One speci￿cation of such a criterion is
￿t + ’(yt ￿ yt￿1) = 0: (18)
This target criterion corresponds to the ￿rst-order condition for optimal
policy under commitment in a timeless perspective given the simple New
Keynesian model presented in Section 4. Woodford suggests, however, that
this criterion could provide a reasonably favorable outcome in more com-
plex models, even if the ￿rst-order conditions in such models are less simple
than (18). The MPC could vote on ’ and on the state-variables and para-
meters determining in￿ ation and the output gap. The interest rate decision
will then follow from the model and the target criterion, and the MPC
can decide on the premise-variables instead of the interest rate. Generally,
the research on monetary policy design has emphasized the importance of
managing private sector expectations by committing to a speci￿c reaction
pattern. In order to make the reaction pattern credible, the central bank
must be transparent about this pattern. Even if this literature does not
focus on the collective nature of monetary policy decisions, it is hard to see
how an MPC can commit to a certain reaction pattern without reaching a
collective decision on this reaction pattern. Thus, we ￿nd that the recent
research on monetary policy has clear focus on deciding on the premises for
policy decisions.
It is, however, possible to implement PBP without having to reach a col-
lective decision on the reaction pattern represented by a policy rule or target
criterion, and we will here propose an alternative procedure. The procedure
can be described as follows: 1) The MPC decides on a core model.20 2) The
MPC decides on the inputs to the model (state-variables and parameters).
3) The sta⁄produces a menu of forecasts based on 1) and 2), but with alter-
native weights ￿ on output stability relative to price stability. 4) The MPC
20This may not always be feasible, for example if each member believes in di⁄erent type
of models and are not able to rank the alternative models. In practice, however, we do
observe that many central banks have MPC-owned core models.
25votes on the alternative forecast scenarios conditioned on the di⁄erent ￿s.
5) The winning conditional forecast scenario determines a unique interest
rate (path).
With this procedure, the judgments are aggregated in a step-by-step
fashion consistent with how the forecasts are built. By voting on alternative
conditional forecasts, which di⁄er only due to monetary policy, the MPC
members will in e⁄ect vote on ￿ even if this is done indirectly. Most MPC
members, except perhaps academics with background in monetary theory,
would probably ￿nd it more natural to express preferences by voting on
alternative conditional forecasts than by voting on a parameter like ￿.
This procedure is somewhat similar to Svensson￿ s (2010) proposal on how
monetary policy should be evaluated and decided upon. Svensson suggests
that a set of e¢ cient forecasts should be constructed, where ￿ e¢ cient￿means
that it should not be possible to stabilize in￿ ation or output better without
stabilizing the other less well (in terms of the discunted sum of expected
square in￿ ation and output gaps). The set of e¢ cient forecasts, from which
the policymakers should choose, re￿ ects di⁄erent ￿s. Although Svensson
does not discuss premise-based versus conclusion-based decision-making, his
proposed decision procedure is in our view only consistent with a premise-
based procedure. The reason is that if the MPC members should choose
from a menu of e¢ cient forecasts, representing di⁄erent ￿s, each member
must accept the alternative forecasts as e¢ cient. This requires that prior to
the provision of e¢ cient forecasts, the MPC must have decided on a model
from which the forecasts are derived and judgmental inputs to the model.
One might argue that in those central banks where the MPC decides
not only on the current interest rate, but on the whole interest rate path,
a premise-based procedure as the one suggested above is even more advan-
tageous. When having decided on the model, the MPC could vote on the
alternatives interest rate paths directly. If instead decisions are conclusion-
based and there is disagreement about models or parameters, it would be
di¢ cult for an MPC to decide on a whole interest rate path without having
to vote on each point on the interest rate path, which would be a cumber-
some procedure.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed the relevance of the discursive dilemma
for monetary policy decisions in MPCs. We have shown that under major-
ity voting, the existence of the dilemma can only be excluded in the case
where the MPC members only disagree on one premise-variable and when
the relationship between this premise-variable and the decision is monotonic.
Furthermore, we ￿nd that when the MPC members disagree on the para-
meters, a premise-based procedure tends to give lower expected loss than a
26conclusion-based procedure. The reason is that the functional form of the
dependence function implies that conclusion-based decisions tend to give too
weak policy responses to shocks. Only in the case where the MPC members
are overcon￿dent, and thus do not take parameter uncertainty su¢ ciently
into account, can a conclusion-based procedure be a second-best solution
that counteracts the negative e⁄ects of overcon￿dence. In addition, we have
shown that the discursive dilemma represents a challenge to consistent com-
munication. If the MPC uses a conclusion-based procedure and votes on the
interest rate, the aggregate judgments represented by the economic forecasts
published by the central bank are often inconsistent with the interest rate
decision. Consistency between the interest rate decision and the published
forecasts will, however, always be achieved with a premise-based procedure.
The results in our analysis thus favor premise-based decisions, and the results
have implications for how central banks (and other organizations) should or-
ganize the decision process. The results in this paper should, however, be
regarded as a ￿rst step towards a better understanding of the properties
of alternative decision-making procedures in committees. As postulated by
Faust and Henderson (2004), and con￿rmed in our analysis, it is not possible
to derive general results saying that one decision procedure always dominate
the others normatively.
The underlying reason for why MPC members have di⁄erent judgments
is uncertainty. The type of disagreement we have analyzed is related to the
type of uncertainty considered by Brainard (1967). There has been a huge
literature on uncertainty and robustness since Brainard￿ s seminal paper,
and future work on judgment aggregation in monetary policy could ￿nd
inspiration from this literature. For example, one strand of the literature on
monetary policy under uncertainty considers robust policy rules when there
is uncertainty about the true model. In line with this, one could analyze the
robustness of the alternative decision procedures when the majority of the
MPC may base their interest rate votes on the wrong model. Furthermore,
if the MPC members believe in di⁄erent kind of models, or have di⁄erent
"decision heuristics" (Blinder (2007)), it might be the case that premise-
based decisionmaking is not possible. Faust and Henderson (2004) seem to
have such a case in mind when arguing against multi-stage decisionsmaking.
Monetary policy decisions are, however, complex decisions, and it might well
be the case that an appropriate decision framework is to use a premise-based
procedure at some stages of the process, and a conclusion-based procedure
on other stages where it is not possible, or simply not practical, to use a
premise-based procedure. In any case, it is important to be aware of the
possible existence of the discursive dilemma in collective economic decisions
in general, and monetary policy decisions in particular.
27Appendix:
Proof of Proposition 1
For the poof we need some auxiliary terminology and more precise de￿ni-
tions.
The decision variable can take values in a non-empty set Y ￿ R. This
set has at least two elements and might be ￿nite or in￿nite. Examples are
Y = R+ (the decison variable is continuous but with a zero lower bound-
restriction), Y = f0:25;0:50;:::g (the decision variable is discrete with a zero
lower bound), and Y = f5:0;5:50g (there are only two alternative values of
the policy variable). Thus,
D : P1 ￿ ::: ￿ Pk ! Y:
We assume that the dependence function is surjective.21
An estimate is an element in Pj or Y . Estimates will be denoted by
small letters. Estimates of premise-variables will be subindexed, i.e. xj;zj
are two estimates in Pj, and xk;zk are two estimates in Pk, and so on. A
premisevector, denoted x, is a vector of estimates with one estimate for each
of the k premise-variables, i.e. x = (x1;:::;xk) 2 P1 ￿ ::: ￿ Pk. A sequence,
denoted q, consists of a premisevector x and an estimate of the conclusion
y. We say that the sequence q = (x;y) respects the dependence function if
D(x) = y. Let X ￿ P1 ￿ ::: ￿ Pk ￿ Y be the set of sequences that respects
the dependence function. A pro￿le individual estimates, denoted g 2 X n,
is an (k + 1)n-tuple with one sequence for each member. For any pro￿le
g 2 X n, denote the vector of median estimates of the premises xm(g) and
the median estimate of the decision variable ym(g). There is a discursive
dilemma for pro￿le g if D(xm(g)) 6= ym(g).
Proof
Put k = 1. If D is weakly monotonic, it follows from g 2 X n(individual
sequences respect D) that D(xm(g)) = ym(g) for all g 2 X n. If D is (strictly)
non-monotonic, jP1j > 2. If jP1j > 2 and D is (strictly) non-monotonic it
is, for any n, straight forward to make an example where D(xm(g)) 6= ym(g)
and g 2 X n.
Put k > 1. Say that two premise vectors x0 and x00 are distinct if
x0 6= x00. Say that two premise vectors x0 = (x1;:::;xk) and x00 = (z1;:::;zk)
are strictly distinct if for all j 2 f1;:::;kg, xj 6= zj. As jPjj > 1 for j = 1;:::;k
there are (always) four sequences, q0 = (x0;y0), q00 = (x00;y00), q￿ = (x￿;y￿),
21A function D is said to be surjective or onto, if its values span its whole codomain;
that is, for every y 2 Y , there is at least one vector (x1;::;xk) 2 X1 ￿ ::: ￿ Xk such that
D(x1;::;xk) = y.
28q￿￿ = (x￿￿;y￿￿) in X such that:22
(i) x0;x00;x￿;x￿￿ are distinct vectors, x0;x00 are strictly distinct, x￿;x￿￿ are
strictly distinct, the only di⁄erence between x￿ and x0 is the estimate
on premise-variable 1 where the estimate of variable 1 in x￿ is the same
as in x00, and the only di⁄erence between x￿￿ and x00 is the estimate
on premise-variable 1 where the estimate of variable 1 in x￿￿ is the
same as in x0.
(ii)




To simplify, and without loss of generality, we put n = 3. Let q0, q00, q￿,
q￿￿ be de￿ned as in (i) and (ii).
Suppose D(z0) = D(z00) for any pair of strictly distinct premise vectors.
Then D(x0) = D(x00) and D(x￿) = D(x￿￿). Then there is a dilemma for
at least one pro￿le consisting of exactly three of of the four sequences q0, q00,
q￿, q￿￿ unless D(x0) = D(x00) = D(x￿) = D(x￿￿). The latter can not hold
(for all) sequences ful￿lling (i) and (ii) when jY j > 1.
Suppose D(z0) > D(z00) for at least one pair of strictly distinct premise
vectors. We may have 5 cases. We will now show that in all of these cases
there is pro￿le g 2 X n such that D(xm(g)) 6= ym(g).
Case 1 D(x￿) = 2 [D(x0);D(x00)]. Then D(xm(g)) 6= ym(g) for g = (q0;q00;q￿) 2
X n.
Case 2 D(x￿) 2 [D(x0);D(x00)i and D(x￿￿) < D(x00). Then D(xm(g)) 6=
ym(g) for g = (q￿;q￿￿;q00) 2 G.
Case 3 D(x￿) 2 [D(x0);D(x00)i and D(x￿￿) ￿ D(x00). Then D(xm(g)) 6=
ym(g) for g = (q￿;q￿￿;q0) 2 G.
For the two cases when D(x￿) 2 hD(x0);D(x00)], the proof is as for
Case 2 and 3.
Proof of Proposition 2
Put vt = 0. Then (c.f. (11))






22Example when k = 3: x
0 = (a;b;c), x
00 = (d;e;f), x
￿ = (d;b;c), x
￿￿ = (a;e;f)
29D(￿) has one only one local maximum (which is also global maximum) if
ut > 0 and only one local minimum (which is also global minimum) if ut < 0.
We only consider the case when ut > 0 as the proof is parallel if ut < 0.
Consider a pro￿le g. Denote the largest estimate of ￿ in this pro￿le pmax,
and the smallest element pmin. Denote argmaxD(p) by p￿. We say that the
pro￿le g is dispersed pmin < p￿ < pmax. If g is not dispersed, all estimates
of ￿ are on the monotonic part of D(p) and there is no discursive dilemma.
Let g be dispersed. Denote the median estimate of ￿ (among the esti-




be bigger than D(pm) as D(p) is strictly concave. We are left to investigate
the following two cases.
Case 1: D(pmax) > D(pm) or D
￿
pmin￿
> D(pm). Then rp = rc.
Case 2: D(pmax) < D(pm) and D
￿
pmin￿
< D(pm). Then rp > rc.
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